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“The outlook wasn’t brilliant for the Mudville Nine that day.”1 So begins
Ernest Thayer’s famous homage to baseball and the fall of the proud. Two
missed opportunities to swing at the ball and a third chance not-quite-joined led
the mighty Casey to disappoint the crowds and strike out.2 Life occasionally
imitates fiction, and alas, American separation-of-powers law occasionally
mimics baseball.
Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue3 hardly represents the
Supreme Court’s finest moment in separation-of-powers jurisprudence. The
majority penned an anemic opinion that inexplicably characterized an officer
who was subject to presidential removal as exercising the judicial power of the
United States. Rather than acknowledge that a power to remove is a power to
control and that the Court endorsed presidential control of the exercise of judi-
cial power, the majority scarcely recognized any problem.
Nonetheless, it is unlikely the legal commentariat will add the 1991 major-
ity opinion any time soon to an “anti-canon” of bad opinions.4 After all, the
specific issue presented is as bloodless as separation-of-powers law gets. It is
unlikely to elicit the anger and passion that substantive due process opinions—
especially those concerning abortion—so readily generate.5
Taxpayer Freytag had asked the Court to hold that Congress had improp-
erly vested the power to appoint special trial judges in the chief judge of the
U.S. Tax Court, in violation of the Appointments Clause, and that accordingly
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1 Ernest Lawrence Thayer, Casey at the Bat, S.F. EXAMINER, June 3, 1888, available at
http://www.baseball-almanac.com/poetry/po_case.shtml (last visited Mar. 3, 2012).
2 Id.
3 Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868 (1991).
4 Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379 (2011) (noting anticanon of cases
that “embodies a set of propositions that all legitimate constitutional decisions must be pre-
pared to refute”); see also Edward J. Larson, Symposium: Supreme Mistakes, Anti-Canonical
Considerations, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1 (2011) (introducing constitutional anti-canon of Dred
Scott, Plessy, Buck, Erie Railroad, and Korematsu).
5 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing a substantive due process right
to abortion).
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the special trial judge’s exercise of judicial power was void.6 No justice dis-
sented from the Court’s 9-0 judgment that the arrangement comported with the
Appointments Clause.7 The majority’s opinion, however, drew a sharp 5–4
division as to Justice Blackmun’s rationale,8 which Justice Scalia called not
only wrong, but “full of danger for the future of our system of separate and
coequal powers.”9 Thus, like Morrison v. Olson before it, Freytag pitted two
conservative Republican former heads of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)
against one another on a separation-of-powers question10—on the one hand,
Chief Justice Rehnquist, who joined the majority and assigned the opinion to
Blackmun, and on the other, Justice Scalia, who led the concurring justices
opposing the majority rationale.
Scalia did not fall into Blackmun’s error of authorizing cross-branch con-
trol of officers. His concurring opinion, however, is infected with an anti-con-
ceptualism that proves problematic for the separation of powers. This approach
resists classification of governmental functions by resort to any definition of
what functions constitute the proper exercise of “legislative,” “executive,” or
“judicial” power. Instead, Scalia’s approach in Freytag defines the nature of
the judicial power solely with recourse to the officer’s identity and official
attributes.11 Unfortunately, this approach—doubtlessly motivated in part by
Scalia’s judicial methodological preference for categorical rules over case-by-
case judgments under potentially elastic standards—makes it difficult to distin-
guish, among other things, impermissible from permissible delegations of
power.
Why is it important to take the time to dissect Freytag in a post mortem?
In some ways, a benighted opinion, when its result is right, but for the wrong
reasons, is easier to overlook than a very bad decision that reaches the wrong
result. This is particularly the case where, as here, the opinion purports to inter-
pret the Constitution. In structural constitutional matters, the Court writes
almost in granite. Stare decisis in the face of a high bar to formal amendment
means that (realistically) the Court needs to undo its own mischief. The Court
has already indicated willingness to chip away at aspects of Freytag.12 Moreo-
6 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 872. This was the petitioner’s fallback argument. The petitioner
argued that the authorizing statute limited the use of special trial judges to only cases that are
“minor, simple, or narrow.” Id. at 873–74.
7 Id. at 869–70; id. at 892 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
8 It would probably be more accurate to describe the work product as an opinion from
“Justice Blackmun’s chambers.” See, e.g., David J. Garrow, The Brains Behind Blackmun,
LEGAL AFF., May/June 2005, at 34 (describing Justice Blackmun “as a justice who increas-
ingly ceded far too much of his judicial authority to his clerks”).
9 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 901.
10 Jay S. Bybee & Tuan N. Samahon, William Rehnquist, The Separation of Powers, and the
Riddle of the Sphinx, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1735, 1755 (2006).
11 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 911 (“[I]t is the identity of the officer—not something instrinsic
about the mode of decision-making or type of decision—that tells us whether the judicial
power is being exercised.”).
12 See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138,
3162–63 (2010) (adopting Scalia’s view from his Freytag concurrence that a “department”
is “a freestanding component of the Executive Branch” and rejecting Freytag majority’s
view that “department” is only a cabinet-level entity); see also Edmond v. United States, 520
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ver, the Court as presently constituted,13 which includes none of the original
Freytag majority,14 might be prepared to overrule Freytag’s majority rationale.
Indeed, a new separation-of-powers challenge to the authority of the U.S. Tax
Court, presented this time as a removal issue rather than as an Appointments
Clause issue as in Freytag, may provide the Court with a vehicle for the recon-
sideration of the issue. Should this faulty majority rationale be revisited, an
analysis of the limitations of the concurring opinion’s alternative approach
could prove helpful.
Part I considers the unusual litigation of Freytag and explains how the Tax
Court managed not only to have its views heard, but ultimately adopted in the
Supreme Court. Part II examines the majority’s opinion and how its myopic
focus on appointments allowed the removal issue it created to be left largely
unaddressed. In addition, Part II addresses Blackmun’s half-hearted effort at
articulating what constitutes “the judicial power of the United States.” Finally,
Part III focuses on Scalia’s separate concurrence and suggests his formal
approach to defining power with resort to an officers’ characteristics mistakes
as sufficient what is merely necessary.
I. THE TAX COURT’S FRIEND AND THE LITIGATION OF FREYTAG
Freytag was litigated in the Supreme Court as a three-way clash of the
titans. Counsel for petitioning taxpayer Freytag was none other than Kathleen
Sullivan,15 noted constitutional law scholar and (later) Stanford Law School
dean. She advocated the view that the chief judge of the U.S. Tax Court could
not constitutionally appoint the special trial judges. According to Sullivan, the
special trial judges were officers,16 and the chief judge was ineligible to receive
the appointment power.17 The chief judge was plainly not the President.
Neither was the chief judge the head of an executive department,18 nor was the
Tax Court a part of “the Courts of Law.”19
Then-Deputy Solicitor General John G. Roberts, Jr., now Chief Justice of
the United States, represented the U.S. government.20 He contended special
trial judges were employees, not officers, and therefore the Appointments
U.S. 651, 664 & n.2 (1997) (characterizing Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces as an
executive branch entity notwithstanding its exclusively adjudicative functions).
13 In addition to Justices Scalia and Kennedy who joined the separate concurrence, Chief
Justice John Roberts (who advocated for the position adopted by Scalia in Freytag) and
Justices Thomas, Alito, and possibly Kagan, who all had very substantial executive branch
professional experience, are potential votes to overrule, or at least seriously limit, the most
objectionable aspects of Freytag detailed in this Essay.
14 The Freytag majority included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens.
15 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 870.
16 Id. at 880.
17 See Brief for Petitioners at 29, Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868 (1991) (No. 90-762),
1991 WL 11007938.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 870.
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Clause, which controls only appointment of officers, was not implicated.21
Alternatively, Roberts argued that if the special trial judges were indeed infer-
ior officers, then the Chief Judge of the Tax Court was a head of an executive
department,22 just as the Second Circuit had ruled during the pendency of the
Freytag litigation.23 He agreed with Sullivan that the Chief Judge was ineligi-
ble as a non-Article III officer to receive appointment power as a part of “the
Courts of Law.”24
Neither Sullivan nor Roberts, however, carried the day. Curiously, the
Court adopted a position neither had advocated. Erwin Griswold, amicus curiae
and the former dean of the Harvard Law School, participated in the case to
present his own views, and ostensibly not as counsel for any party. Griswold
had attempted to appear as counsel for the judges of the U.S. Tax Court in the
Second Circuit,25 but was able to appear only as amicus on his own behalf.26
The Tax Court judges for their part wished to advance their view that the chief
judge of the Tax Court and all the other Tax Court judges, including the special
trial judges, belonged to “the Courts of Law.”27 The Solicitor General’s office
rejected that view.28 It took the position that the Tax Court, notwithstanding its
statutory denomination as a “legislative court,” was a division of the Article II
executive branch.29 Although the Solicitor General’s office refused to permit
Griswold to file an amicus brief on behalf of the Tax Court,30 it agreed to allow
him to file one to represent his own views, but not as counsel for the Tax Court
judges.31 Nonetheless, Griswold consulted with, and effectively represented,
the judges of the Tax Court.32
Griswold’s virtual representation was unusual (and perhaps even
improper), but does not form any procedural ground for discarding Freytag’s
result. Griswold’s shadow advocacy did not steal upon an unsuspecting Court
or parties. His brief candidly disclosed to the Court that his position was the
same as the Tax Court’s.33 Indeed, the possibility of this grey eminence—as
21 Brief for Respondent at 28–32, Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868 (1991) (No. 90-762),
1991 WL 11007941.
22 Id. at 33, 38–40.
23 Samuels, Kramer & Co. v. Comm’r, 930 F.2d 975, 990–94 (2nd Cir. 1991).
24 See Brief for Respondent, supra note 21, at 9, 36–38 & nn.28–29.
25 Affidavit in Support of Motion for Leave to File a Brief as Amici Curiae and for an
Extension of Time at 1–2, Samuels, Kramer & Company v. Comm’r, Nos. 90-4060, 90-4064
(2d Cir. Aug. 10, 1990).
26 Samuels, 930 F.2d at 977.
27 Affidavit, supra note 25, ¶4.
28 Brief for Respondent, supra note 21, at 9, 36–38 & nn.28–29.
29 Id. at 9, 38.
30 Letter from Erwin N. Griswold to Laurence H. Tribe, Harvard Law School (May 1, 1991)
in ERWIN N. GRISWOLD PAPERS, Box 198, Folder 18 (Harvard Law Library) (on file with
author). Griswold reported that the Department of Justice took the position that only it was
authorized to “represent officers of the United States.” Id.
31 Id.
32 See, e.g., Letter from Arthur L. Nims, III, Chief Judge, U.S. Tax Court, to Erwin N.
Griswold, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue (June 28, 1991) in ERWIN N. GRISWOLD PAPERS, Box
152, Folder 3 (Harvard Law Library) (on file with author) (thanking Griswold for his ongo-
ing representation).
33 Brief of Erwin N. Griswold as Amicus Curiae at 1, Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868
(1991) (No. 90-762), 1991 WL 11007939.
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unofficial advocate for the Tax Court judges—having sway with an older gen-
eration of jurists on the Court suggests the Tax Court may have wanted Gris-
wold to tip his hand as to his effective representation.34 For its part, the
Solicitor General’s office was not taken by surprise and responded to Gris-
wold’s arguments that the Tax Court was a part of “the Courts of Law.”35
Although the special trial judges’ appointments were vindicated by a 9-0
margin and the Tax Court feˆted its shadow advocate’s victory,36 the judges
viewed the case as a close call.37 For them, the real battle was not whether the
Supreme Court sustained the appointments arrangement but how it was upheld:
Would the Court classify the Tax Court as an Article II executive department,
subject to presidential control, or as a unit of “the Courts of Law”? On that
count, the Tax Court’s victory was “by a narrow margin,” decided by a single
vote.38
II. BLACKMUN AT THE BAT
A. Strike One: Cross-Branch Removal
The petitioners in Freytag challenged the authority of the special trial
judge’s order under the Appointments Clause. The way the Court resolved that
challenge, however, left the door open for a potential separation-of-powers
challenge from a different angle—not as an appointment issue, but as a chal-
lenge based on the Tax Court judges’ removability by the President. Title 26,
§ 7443(f) authorizes the President to remove Tax Court judges for cause.39
That provision becomes particularly problematic after Freytag. Blackmun and
the majority characterized the Tax Court judges (and their special trial judges)
as exercising “the judicial power of the United States,”40 even though they lack
Article III tenure and salary protection and, significantly, are subject to poten-
34 See Letter from Nims, supra note 32. “I wanted to formally thank you personally and on
behalf of the Tax Court for giving us the benefit of your knowledge, wisdom and prestige in
connection with our travails in Samuels, Kramer in the Second Circuit and Freytag in the
Supreme Court.” Id. (emphasis added). This gambit appeared to work. The older justices
were persuaded by Griswold, including William Rehnquist.  Griswold’s tenure as Solicitor
General (1967–73) had overlapped with Rehnquist’s tenure as Assistant Attorney General in
the Nixon administration’s Office of Legal Counsel (1969–71) and then Rehnquist’s early
years on the Supreme Court.
35 Brief for the Respondent, supra note 21, at 36 n.28, 42 n.34.
36 Letter from Erwin N. Griswold, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue to Arthur L. Nims, III, Chief
Judge, U.S. Tax Court (July 10, 1991) in ERWIN N. GRISWOLD PAPERS, Box 152, Folder 3
(Harvard Law Library) (thanking Chief Judge for a celebratory victory luncheon hosted by
Tax Court in Griswold’s honor) (on file with author).
37 Chief Judge Arthur L. Nims, III thanked Griswold for his advocacy. “The result in
Freytag, though by a narrow margin, does ultimately vindicate our position that the Tax
Court is a court of law, and for that we owe you, Dean Griswold, a deep debt of gratitude.”
Letter from Arthur L. Nims, III, Chief Judge, United States Tax Court, to Erwin N. Gris-
wold, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue (July 17, 1991) in ERWIN N. GRISWOLD PAPERS, Box
152, Folder 3 (Harvard Law Library) (emphasis added) (on file with author).
38 Id.
39 26 U.S.C. § 7443(f) (2006) (“Judges of the Tax Court may be removed by the President,
after notice and opportunity for public hearing, for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfea-
sance in office, but for no other cause.”).
40 Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 891 (1991).
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tial presidential removal.41 This cross-branch removal power confers upon the
President a power to control those officers and threatens the independent exer-
cise of the judicial power.42 This mixing of judicial and executive authorities
violates a basic separation-of-powers maxim and courts the attendant danger of
tyranny.43 Madison approvingly quoted Montesquieu on this very point: “Were
[the power of judging] joined to the executive power, the judge might behave
with all the violence of an oppressor.”44
The separate concurrence suggested that the majority failed to appreciate
the consequences of effectively authorizing cross-branch removal power (even
only for cause),45 but understandably did not elaborate the point. Freytag’s
counsel had framed the challenge only as an appointments challenge. She had
not pressed the other separation-of-powers issue of judicial officer removability
by the President. The majority, for its part, did little to rebut the concurrence’s
passing observation. It concluded “the Tax Court remains independent of the
Executive and Legislative Branches” simply because its decisions are “not sub-
ject to review by . . . the President.”46 It did not mention the presidential power
to remove tax judges or any other mechanism of control.
Why did the Freytag majority attend so little to the consequences of its
appointments analysis for the presidential removal power? Perhaps much like
Thayer’s Casey up to bat, it simply refused to swing “in haughty grandeur” and
functionalist disdain—“that ain’t my style”—and earned itself a first strike.47
An instant replay, however, suggests the issue was worth examining in
depth. The power to remove is the most powerful tool that a principal has to
control an agent: it backstops all other tools for control. If a principal lacks the
ultimate authority to enforce orders and requests with an agent’s termination,
the agent may simply choose not to follow the principal.
Although the Court has recognized that the power to appoint is also a
powerful tool for control,48 it is less powerful than removal authority as an
instrument to bend an agent to a principal’s will. Removal authority (and the in
41 To be sure, the grounds for removal are only for “cause.” 26 U.S.C. § 7443(f) (enumerat-
ing grounds for removal as “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office”). Bow-
sher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986), however, noted these very same grounds for removal
were “very broad” and “could sustain removal . . . for any number of actual or perceived
transgressions.” Id. at 729.
42 Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 727 n.5.
43 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison).
44 Id.
45 See Freytag, 501 U.S. at 912.
46 Id. at 891. In Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), Blackmun had approved a
distressingly similar cross-branch presidential authority to remove Article III judges from the
U.S. Sentencing Commission “only for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office or for other
good cause shown.” Id. at 368, 409–11. That arrangement, while still problematic, did not
oust judges from their position as judges, only as members of the Commission. Id. at 411.
47 See Thayer, supra note 1.
48 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922 (1997) (questioning parenthetically “if indeed
meaningful Presidential control is possible without the power to appoint and remove”).
Appointment power permits the appointing officer to select subordinates that share policy
priorities and ideology. See also Tuan Samahon, The Czar’s Place in Presidential Adminis-
tration, and What the Excepting Clause Teaches Us About Delegation, 2011 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 169, 193 (2011) (describing presidential motive to exclude the Senate from the appoint-
ments process).
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terrorem threat of removal) is a continuing mechanism for control. In contrast,
the enticement of promotion to a higher office through a subsequent appoint-
ment may provide some incentive for an agent’s ongoing compliance, but
removal power provides immediate control, or as the Court has termed it, a
“here-and-now subservience.”49 This relatively greater control imparted by the
power to remove reflects a theory of ambitious and self-seeking human nature
embodied in Machiavelli’s infamous advice to a prince that it “is much safer to
be feared than loved,”50 if by “loved” we understand an agent’s voluntary com-
pliance to a superior’s requests.51 Accordingly, Machiavelli’s advice to the
prince was that as “men lov[e] according to their own will and fear[ ] according
to that of the prince, a wise prince should establish himself on that which is in
his own control and not in that of others.”52 Those who have been appointed
may feel favor toward the appointing officer, but that loyalty is not necessarily
enduring. Thus, although the President appoints Article III judges, they are
thought to be independent because they hold their offices during good behavior.
As Madison put it, “the permanent tenure by which the appointments are held
in that [judicial] department, must soon destroy all sense of dependence on the
authority conferring them.”53 Thus, it is the power to remove that serves as a
continuing power to control.
But is a qualified power to remove still a power to control? The scope of
removal authority dictates the scope of control. A plenary power to remove for
any reason whatsoever, i.e., classic removal at will, affords the principal the
most complete control over an agent and is requisite for a true agency relation-
ship. The power to control becomes less effective if the power to remove is
limited or conditioned on certain preconditions. “For cause” grounds for
removal, such as inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance, may restrict the
principal’s ability to remove (and thereby control) and may require that the
officer exercising the removal authority articulate a justificatory ground for
removal. Interpreted at their most permissive, the restrictions could allow the
removing officer plenary control of what counts as good cause or removal on
an unscrutinized pretext of the presence of a ground to remove.54 At their most
49 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727 n.5 (1986).
50 NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE, ch. XVII.
51 Madison shared this view of mankind, or at least thought it most prudent to structure
government based on the supposition that men were not “angels.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 51
(James Madison).
52 MACHIAVELLI, supra note 50.
53 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
54 Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958), is not to the contrary. The Court created an
implied “for cause” limitation against presidential removal of War Claims Commission
members because they performed a “quasi-judicial” and not purely executive function. See
id. at 356. Wiener, however, does not stand for the proposition that the President cannot
have his own man serve. Wiener sought only damages for past wages (which the Court
allowed him to pursue), not reinstatement to office. Id. at 349. This approach is consistent
with how common law courts handle agency contracts that specify a term of service. An
agent is not entitled to continue to bind the principal for the duration of the contractual term.
Instead, the agency is terminated at the will of the principal and the courts employ a contrac-
tual term of service only to calculate the quantum of damages. Thus, on this approach, a term
of service accompanied with a “for cause” limitation provides no shield against removal as
an agent, only a means for calculating the amount of damages.
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stringent, such removal restrictions could eliminate control altogether, except
on proof of conditions present.
Blanket presidential authority to remove a subordinate does entail greater
control, but the tradeoff is usually greater transparency and political accounta-
bility to constituents and Congress for any ill-conceived exercise of that power.
This greater transparency likely results from a political presumption that arises
from plenary control. Consider, for example, a high visibility removal, such as
the “Saturday Night Massacre” in which President Richard Nixon ordered his
DOJ subordinates to terminate Watergate special counsel Archibald Cox.55
Attorney General Elliot Richardson and then Deputy Attorney General William
Ruckelshaus received the order, but refused to comply and instead tendered
their noisy resignations.56 Nixon, however, insisted on the removal. Solicitor
General Robert Bork, acting head of the Justice Department, ultimately obeyed
and terminated Cox.57 The resulting political firestorm generated presidential
accountability for the removal. Subsequently, Nixon was politically obligated
to appoint a new Watergate special counsel.58
By contrast, “for cause” removal confers less control but is likely to be
less transparent. This lack of transparency results from the stigma attached with
removal “for cause,” the lack of any public presumption of control, and the
possibility that subordinates bargain in the shadow of the potential opprobrium
of “for cause” removal—even “cause” improperly asserted. Thus, in terrorem
“voluntary” resignations function as removals-in-fact but without the attendant
transparency and political accountability for the removing officer.
To illustrate, consider the back-story of the Reagan administration’s
threatened exercise of removal power over a legislative court judge. Judge
Albert B. Fletcher, Jr., who served on the U.S. Court of Military Appeals (later
renamed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces), was arrested, tried,
and subsequently convicted for homosexual solicitation of an undercover police
officer.59 Public records concerning the now-deceased Judge Fletcher indicate
that political pressure was brought to bear by the White House to force
Fletcher’s resignation from the military court for his same-sex peccadilloes.60
Although the Office of Legal Counsel determined the White House likely
55 Philip Allen Lacovara, United States v. Nixon: The Prelude, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1061,
1064 (1999).
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Removal of an officer entails receiving approval for a replacement, which may require
some form of confirmation, congressional oversight, or other political accountability. See,
e.g., Seth Barrett Tillman, The Puzzle of Hamilton’s Federalist No. 77, 33 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 149, 151–57 (2010) (explaining Hamilton’s suggestion Senate’s consent would
be required to “displace” as well as appoint).
59 Charles Fishman, Federal Judge Convicted of Soliciting Homosexual Act, WASH. POST,
Feb. 28, 1985, at C1.
60 These records were recently made available to me pursuant to a Presidential Records Act
request. The leading history of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, which
covered only its history to 1980, did not mention Fletcher’s 1985 conviction and subsequent
retirement. See generally JONATHAN LURIE, PURSUING MILITARY JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES, 1951–1980 (1998)
(describing history of military court to 1980).
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lacked any “for cause” grounds to terminate Fletcher,61 the in terrorem effect
was nonetheless potent and precipitated his resignation.62 Fletcher negotiated
with the White House a retirement based on physical disability, complete with
a supporting doctor’s note.63 To be sure, the episode presented no cross-branch
removal issue,64 but it does demonstrate the potential for non-transparent
removals not supported by any legal cause, narrowly conceived.
Whether a President, his partisans, or third parties might orchestrate a sim-
ilar forced resignation-cum-removal from the U.S. Tax Court is not a mere
speculative exercise. Lanny Davis, counsel for the aggrieved Kanter plaintiffs
in Ballard v. Commissioner, petitioned President Obama to institute an investi-
gation of Senior Tax Court Judge Howard A. Dawson Jr. with the object of
possibly removing him.65 To date, Senior Judge Dawson has not been removed.
Barring a transparent and formal process, however, it would be difficult to
determine if any judge negotiated a quiet removal by way of resignation in lieu
of a potentially public spectacle. Whether any prior administration may have
precipitated resignations of Tax Court judges, or entertained referrals proposing
such a course of action, is not a matter detailed in any generally available pub-
lic record.66
61 Ralph W. Tarr, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum
for Carol E. Dinkins, Deputy Attorney Gen. (Nov. 27, 1984) (on file with author) (“[W]e do
not believe that the President is authorized by the applicable statute to dismiss the judge on
the basis of his arrest.”).
62 Letter from Albert B. Fletcher, Jr., U.S. Court of Military Appeals to Ronald W. Reagan,
President (Mar. 12, 1985) (requesting retirement because of physical disability) (on file with
author).
63 Fred F. Fielding, White House Gen. Counsel, Memorandum for the President (Sept. 6,
1985) (noting coronary artery disease as asserted disability, but noting also more immediate
and pressing cause for resignation was his recent conviction) (on file with author).
64 Post-Edmond v. United States, the Court clarified that the legislative court known as the
“Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces” is located within the executive, and not the judi-
cial, branch. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 664 & n.2 (1997) (noting presidential
power to remove as a reason why legislative court is located in executive branch) (Scalia, J.).
65
“[W]e call on the president, who has the power to remove a Tax Court judge, to immedi-
ately institute an investigation on whether such removal is justified.” Sam Young, Kanter
Plaintiffs Call for Investigation of Tax Court Judges, TAX NOTES TODAY, Mar. 8, 2010, at
1181.
66 A telltale sign of such a precipitated resignation may be a procedurally irregular, or
unusually hasty, resignation. Cf. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 267 (1977) (noting, in equal protection race discrimination setting, “[d]epartures
from the normal procedural sequence also might afford evidence that improper purposes are
playing a role”). There is an example in Tax Court history of irregularity that possibly sug-
gests a quiet removal. Nixon appointee U.S. Tax Court Judge William H. Quealy suddenly
retired during the Carter administration in advance of his term’s expiry. Several subsequent
Tax Court memoranda opinions noisily noted his apparently abrupt departure and reassign-
ment of cases in early 1980. In particular, one judge remarked a case was “somewhat unu-
sual” because Judge Quealy heard the case but then promptly resigned, making him “not
available for reference.” See, e.g., Kendrick v. Comm’r, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 741 (1980), P-H
T.C. Memo ¶ 80,270 (Sterrett, J.). In Bail Bonds by Marvin Nelson, Inc. v. Commissioner,
another judge again called attention to a case’s procedural history as “unusual” and then
noted that “[a]fter the cases were tried, briefed and submitted in 1979, but before any find-
ings of fact were made or opinion written, Judge Quealy retired from the Court in 1980.”
Bail Bonds, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 294 (1986), P-H T.C. Memo.¶ 86,023. Per Village of Arling-
ton Heights, these abrupt procedural departures might signal an in terrorem resignation or
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B. Strike Two: Missing the Essence of Judicial
Beyond the failure to recognize a power to remove as a power to control,
the question of how to characterize the Tax Court’s power is central to Freytag.
Blackmun’s opinion does not engage in serious conceptual analysis by trying to
ascertain what is encompassed within the exercise of judicial power. Blackmun
and his fellow jurisprudential travelers usually accuse Scalia of being “formal-
istic,” an epithet usually meant to convey a sense that a jurist is placing undue
weight on labels. That description, if intended to capture a simpleminded
endeavor, better describes Blackmun’s, rather than Scalia’s, approach to the
characterization and classification of power at stake in Freytag. Blackmun
engaged in simplistic equivalence: adjudicatory power equals judicial power;
the statute calls the officers “judges” and the institution “court”; and the
officers “subpoena and examine witnesses, order production of documents, and
administer oaths,” etc.67
Scalia’s concurrence adopted the government’s argument that adjudication
is merely a mode of decision-making.68 On this account, it is a mistake to
simplistically equate “adjudication” with “the judicial power.” For Scalia, adju-
dication is not the same as the exercise of judicial power, but a mode of case-
by-case decision-making used by other branches of government as a means of
carrying out their powers. Congress adjudicates under Article I when the House
votes to indict and when the Senate acts as a court of impeachment.69 The
executive branch also uses adjudication as a mode of decision-making in agen-
cies and in determining when a prosecution should be pursued.
Indeed, it is unclear that the judicial power of the United States is inher-
ently limited only to adjudication. The judicial vesting clause grants to the
Supreme Court the judicial power of the United States.70 That initial grant of
power to the federal judiciary is qualified only subsequently by the requirement
of a “case” or “controversy” placed on the judicial power in the enumeration of
jurisdictional grounds.71 Thus, the Constitution’s case-or-controversy language
requires the Court to use adjudication as its principal means of decision-mak-
ing. In the absence of any such limitation, however, the Courts of Law could
exercise judicial power in ways that are not adjudicative or case-by-case, but
categorical, such as would be the case with abstract judicial review.
III. SCALIA’S TURN AT BAT—STRIKE THREE:
CONFUSING NECESSITY FOR SUFFICIENCY
Justice Scalia is surely correct that adjudication is a mode of decision-
making not unique to Article III. Adjudication may be engaged in by executive
branch officers when exercising discretion (on a case-by-case basis) to deter-
other pressure brought to bear, whether from the White House, the Congress, or the Tax
Court itself.
67 Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 890–92.
68 Id. at 909 (Scalia, J., concurring).
69 U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (“The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all
Impeachments.”).
70 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
71 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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mine whether a particular law has been violated under a particular set of cir-
cumstances. But this is not to say that Scalia has captured the entire story with
this insight. For Scalia, rather than resort to abstract definitions of what it
means to exercise judicial power, he would look to the identity of the actor to
determine placement in the tripartite scheme. On this formalist account, a simi-
lar approach applied to executive power would render whatever the President
undertakes to do as executive (by definition), even if the mode of action is
more commonly associated with another branch’s activity, such as codified
rulemaking or case-by-case adjudication.72 It is executive power being exer-
cised because of who does it (the President or other executive officers), not
because of what is being done (rulemaking, prosecuting, administrative law
adjudicating). There is no distinctive “quasi-judicial” or “quasi-legislative”
power exercised by executive officers, simply different modes of making deci-
sions and acting.73
In short, given the performance of adjudicatory functions by a federal
officer, it is the identity of the officer—not something intrinsic about the mode
of decision-making or type of decision—that tells us whether the judicial
power is being exercised. “Our cases demonstrate [that] a particular function,
like a chameleon, will often take on the aspect of the office to which it is
assigned. Where adjudicative decision-makers do not possess life tenure and a
permanent salary, they are ‘incapable of exercising any portion of the judicial
power.’”74
This tautological approach, “he is a judge with salary protection and ten-
ure during good behavior, ergo his exercise of adjudication is the exercise of
the judicial power of the United States,” is tempting. It has the appeal, for
example, of squaring much of what the modern administrative state does with
the Founder’s Constitution. Rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudication before
an executive agency ought present no difficulty—it is not the union of all pow-
ers legislative, executive, and judicial in a single body—because all those
activities are done by executive officials, ergo they are all “executive.”
Scalia’s formalist account, however, may miss the ball for the simple rea-
son that it may mistake as sufficient what is only necessary. The decision
maker’s identity is necessary to classification of the exercise of power (i.e., for
something to be the exercise of the judicial power of the United States, the
individual doing the action must be an Article III judge), but that identification
of the actor is not by itself sufficient to classify a power’s exercise as legisla-
tive, executive, or judicial. After all, there is substantive content to the descrip-
tive terms “legislative,” “executive,” and “judicial.” State constitutions are
similarly organized and ordinary speakers of the English language have more
than a sneaking suspicion that those terms have substantive content beyond the
identity of the actors. One could not, for example, simply re-label the legisla-
72 Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Delegation Really Running Riot, 93 VA. L. REV.
1035, 1048–49 (2007) (describing formalist account of delegation that categorizes type of
power exercised based on who is exercising it).
73
“It has often been observed, correctly in my view, that the line between ‘purely execu-
tive’ functions and ‘quasi-legislative’ or ‘quasi-judicial’ functions is not a clear one, or even
a rational one.” Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 725 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
74 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 911 (citations omitted).
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tive branch “apple,” the executive branch “orange,” and the judicial branch
“lemon” without losing some substantive sense of what each branch does.
Scalia’s approach may be sufficient as a suitable negative rule for exclu-
sion of improper exercises of power, i.e., “the power exercised by the Tax
Courts could not be ‘the judicial power of the United States.’ They lack the
characteristics of Article III judges.” But neither does that approach provide a
positive rule for inclusion. If an officer has Article III tenure and undertakes a
statutory function, such as promulgating sentencing regulations that have the
binding force of law based on a congressional delegation,75 we could not con-
clusively say based on only the officer’s Article III identity whether the activity
was constitutionally permissible without recourse to some definition or concep-
tion of what is encompassed within the scope of “the judicial power of the
United States.”
It is beyond the scope of this brief Essay to propose a solution of the
meaning of the terms “legislative,” “executive,” and “judicial” but it would
seem that the Freytag concurrence’s approach to classifying the exercise of
judicial power mistakes for sufficient what is merely necessary. If, indeed, that
is the case, truly “there is no joy in Mudville—the mighty Supreme Court has
struck out.”76
75 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
76 Thayer, supra note 1.
